Almost all governments issue large amounts of debt. Explanations for this fact based on Ramsey optimal taxation theory face two problems. First, they typically conclude that optimal long-run government debt should be negative. Second, they overlook many promising alternative explanations. We pursue one of these, government impatience, in a model with incomplete financial markets and continuous debt limits. We find that negative government debt is a knife-edge result.that is eliminated for even minimal government impatience. We quantify the implications of the degree of government impatience for long-run government debt, real interest rates, and business cycle dynamics.
Introduction
Examining why it is optimal for governments to issue large amount of debt has long taken a bipolar view on the nature of the governments classifying them either as purely benevolent (Ramsey social planners) or purely selfish, or reelection-oriented (political economy literature). For the former type, the government, acting as a Stackelberg leader, would maximize the welfare function of the private agents taking into the agents' best response to the announced tax policies; as a side effect, minimizing tax distortion prescribes that the government should become a net creditor to the private sector. 1 For the latter type, it has become a common knowledge that an incumbent government would tend to overspend and accumulate excess debt to prevent the opposition from taking office. 2 Our paper investigates the implications of the "right-middle" type of government: the one that is smart enough to envisage how private agents would react to its policies but still aware of the democratic process that might eventually drive it out of office. 3 This paper adds an additional layer of uncertainty to the standard Ramsey optimal taxation literature of the type of Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and Seppälä (2002) to focus on how political uncertainty facing the government propagates to the rest of the economy. Our particular interest would be to see whether bringing in a political economy flavor is enough to generate a more tractable predictions for the level of government debt without moving too far from the benevolent nature of the government, and the answer is yes. Other than the assumption on the type of the government, our model is closely related to Aiyagari et al. (2002) . The government finances exogenous spending through distortionary labor income taxation or through the accumulation or decumulation of debt. Asset markets are incomplete in that government debt can only take the form of one-period nonstate contingent real bonds.
For the sake of comparability with the traditional optimal taxation literature, we decide to stay in the context of the models with full commitment to the sequence of announced policies in the absence of capital investment and capital income taxation. Given our focus on debt, our choice is reinforced by Martin's (2006) overview of the time-consistency literature and his conclusion that, under conventional assumptions of that literature, the long-run government debt is negative. A substantial positive long-run debt level obtains only by assuming that consumption and leisure are complements. Such an assumption in a perfect foresight model with positive initial nominal debt ensures that inflating debt away becomes too costly, as the well-known interest rate manipulation mechanism by Lucas and Stokey (1983) would suggest. Following an approach similar to Azzimonti (2007), we introduce a social planner that recognizes a positive probability of not being reelected into an otherwise standard optimal taxation model with incomplete asset markets. Together with continuous rather than ad-hoc limits on debt, this gives rise to a positive deterministic and stochastic steady state for government debt. This prediction, true even for extremely small deviations from the benchmark case of the Ramsey government, considerably increases the usefulness of the optimal taxation framework while leaving many other of its key results intact. Our contribution is to quantify the impact of political uncertainty on steady state debt to GDP ratios and on business cycle dynamics.
In a model with full commitment and incomplete asset markets such as ours, Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and Seppälä (2002) provide theoretical and numerical examples in which a Ramsey Planner in the long run optimally accumulates claims on the private sector rather than issue debt. 4 This is based on a government precautionary savings argument, given that it is optimal to maximize the financing of government spending out of the interest earnings on government assets while reducing distortionary labor taxation as much as possible. In full commitment models with complete asset markets a similar result can be obtained as long as the Ramsey Planner is free to choose the initial tax on capital or debt, thereby enabling him to engineer an instantaneous and nondistortionary wealth transfer. 5 We show that the conventional result of government precautionary saving does obtain in the limit of our model, when the probability of reelection approaches one and limits on debt in the form of transaction costs of bondholding are not binding. However, introducing only very small transaction costs already eliminates this possibility, implying optimal stochastic steady state government debt very close to zero. More strikingly, even extremely small differences between the public and private discount factors due to probability of reelection smaller than one induce substantial levels of steady state government debt.
Our model is well suited to analyze the response of the economy to periods of political instability. We show that such shocks give rise to tax cuts confirming the common wisdom that political instability can be an independent source of business cycle fluctuations. Tax cuts, in turn, lead to short run economic booms that eventually lead to higher debt, higher real interest rates, and therefore higher taxes, and, ultimately, an economic contraction. While our results appear intuitive in light of the contribution of the political economy literature, the mechanism that propagates political uncertainty to the macroeconomic aggregates operates as follows: if starting from a reasonably low initial level of debt, the optimal response of the government to more political uncertainty is to lower labor income taxes. Increased deficit drives up debt until it reaches a point where further tax cuts would be too costly because of the effect of the debt limits on real interest rates, the government budget, and therefore on the necessity to raise future distortionary taxation.
There is another strand of literature on government debt bias in an optimal taxation context 6 , based on ex-post heterogeneity of agents, as in Aiyagari (1995) , Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) , and Shin (2005) . In this class of models households prefer to accumulate government debt as a buffer to insure against individual idiosyncratic shocks, while a Ramsey Planner prefers to accumulate private debt as a buffer against aggregate risk that facilitates tax smoothing. Shin (2005) shows that if idiosyncratic risk is large enough relative to aggregate risk, equilibrium government debt is positive in the long run. This result however depends on the absence of other assets that might permit self-insurance.
Our way of introducing political uncertainty into the model by differentiating between private and government discount factors has been exploited in the literature to study a number of interesting policy issues. Farhi and Werning (2005) and Phelan (2006) assume that a planner who is able to commit to future allocations has a social welfare criterion that places more weight on the future than do private agents, and find that this modification profoundly alters the optimal social insurance arrangement. Sleet and Yeltekin (2006) show that optimal allocations under equal discount factors but without planner commitment solve the choice problem of planners with higher government discount factors and planner commitment. The overlapping generations literature following Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965) also typically assumes that private agents discount the future at an elevated rate, but in this case due to a positive probability of death rather than a difference in pure rates of time preference. 7 The opposite assumption, and one that we find more plausible as a description of observed policymaking, is that governments have a larger discount factor than private agents, and this has also been used in the literature to understand important policy problems. In Grossman and Van Huyck (1988) the government discounts future utility not only by a pure rate of time preference but also by an additional factor that is determined by the government's expected survival in power, similar to the household probability of death in overlapping generations models. Closest to our assumption of different pure rates of time preference is the seminal work on exchange rate regimes of Velasco (1995, 2000) , whose results depend critically on the assumption that the government is more impatient than private agents.
The optimal taxation literature typically uses upper and lower ad hoc debt limits in conjunction with no-Ponzi and transversality conditions. We also use ad hoc debt limits, but find it useful to introduce continuous debt limits in the form of small bondholding transaction costs, an assumption that is commonly used in other literatures. 8 These costs increase in the stock of bonds. As a consequence, higher market interest rates are required to absorb higher government debt. We find that with this type of debt limit it is straightforward to calibrate the model in a way that replicates industrialized countries' observed government debt to GDP ratios, levels of real interest rates, and elasticities of real interest rates with respect to government debt to GDP ratios. Furthermore, together with policymaker impatience, quadratic transaction costs give rise not only to a positive but also to a history-independent deterministic and stochastic steady state for government debt. This is a critical advantage for the computational solution of the model, as the discussion in Reiter (2005) makes clear. Namely, our assumption facilitates the use of second-order approximations to characterize the long run behavior of the model. We also go one step beyond examining the long run implications by using a global numerical method, based on Monte Carlo simulations, to solve for the transitional dynamics of the model and show how debt gradually reaches its high positive long run level starting from a zero initial stock, the situation for which the initial conditions are quite far from the steady state.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model and defines the competitive and the social planning equilibrium. Section 3 presents our main results. Section 4 concludes.
The Model
The economy consists of three types of agents, households, manufacturing firms and the government. They interact in goods, labor and bond markets. The government acts as a Stackelberg leader who maximizes his objective function over the set of competitive equilibria of the economy. We begin by describing the competitive equilibrium of the decentralized economy and then proceed to the government's planning problem.
Decentralized Economy

Households
The representative household maximizes the present discounted value of utility, using a constant discount factor β. Utility at time t is logarithmic in consumption c t and leisure (1 − t ), where 1 is the time endowment and t is labor supply:
Households' sources of cash flow at time t are after-tax real wages (1 − τ t )w t t (where w t is the real wage and τ t is the labor tax rate) and the redemption value of bonds b t−1 purchased at time t−1. We assume that government debt has a one-period maturity and pays off one unit of the consumption good at maturity. Markets are therefore incomplete in the spirit of Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and Seppälä (2002). The time t price of a bond b t maturing in period t + 1 is q t . Households' uses of cash flow at time t include new bond purchases q t b t , consumption c t , and bondholding transaction costs Φ t = Φ(b t ) net of lump-sum rebate π t . The household budget constraint is
It is a standard approach to assume that the household ultimately owns the financial intermediary and thus receives back the aggregate bondholding transaction costs so that in equilibrium π t = Φ t . Households maximize (1) subject to (2) and (5). The first-order condition for the consumptionleisure choice is
and the consumption-investment choice solves
We consider various specifications for Φ t : a constant transaction cost would lead to a standard kernel bond pricing on the consumer's side; an increasing linear cost would produce the desired increase in returns on debt for higher levels of debt but would punish equally accumulating extra 5 percent of stock at lower and at high debt levels. Therefore, we concentrate on a quadratic cost of bondholding. We assume that if a household wants to maintain a short or a long position in government bonds, it must incur a cost that is quadratic in the ratio of debt b t to per capita output y t , and proportional to y t , where y t is taken as given and B * is a desired level of debt-to-GDP 9 :
9 To simplify the notation, for the rest of the paper, we will proceed with B * = 0.
Choosing a quadratic form for the cost of bondholding enhances the main result of our paper: now the government's decision of whether to hold debt or to accumulate assets would have asymmetric implications for the return on the risk-free bond: other things equal, higher government assets will reduce the return on them compared to the case of ad-hoc debt limits of Aiyagari et al. (2002) and thus bias the government more towards issuing debt. We will further examine the implications of the different discount factors for the price of bond when discussing the political equilibrium of this economy.
Firms
Competitive firms produce output employing a simple linear production function in labor that is subject to a random productivity shock z t :
Therefore, the wage rate in this economy is stochastic and given by
The stochastic process for productivity is
Government
In each period, the government has to finance a given stochastic stream of expenditures g t by levying labor income taxes at the rate τ t and by issuing government debt b gov t :
The stochastic process for government spending is given by
Competitive Equilibrium
We define a government policy G as a stochastic process {τ t } ∞ t=0 . Similarly, an allocation and a price system are lists of stochastic processes {y t , c t ,
. Then we have the following definition.
A competitive equilibrium is an allocation, a price system and a government policy such that, given shock processes and given b −1 :
1. Households maximize (1) subject to (2) and (5).
Firms minimize cost given their production function (6).
3. The goods market clears at all times:
4. The labor market clears at all times:
5. The bonds market clears at all times:
We will adopt the notation t and b t for equilibrium quantities of labor and bonds when solving the social planning problem.
The Social Planning Problem
The government, or social planner, is infinitely lived like households. His objective function is based on private agents' period utility in (1), but his discount factor equals βγ t , where γ t is time-varying and has a meanγ < 1. We therefore have
where Γ 0,t = Π t τ =0 γ τ and Γ 0,0 = 1. We assume that γ t follows an exogenous stochastic process
To highlight the fact that this planner has objectives that do not fully coincide with those of households, we adopt the terminology political equilibrium (as opposed to a Ramsey equilibrium) to refer to the equilibrium induced by the objective function (14) . As in a Ramsey problem, the government maximizes (14) over the set of competitive equilibria, characterized by the optimality conditions (3), (4) and (7) of the agents' problems and by the government budget constraint (9), the economy's resource constraint (11) , and the labor and bonds market clearing conditions (12) and (13) . The last four conditions imply the household budget constraint (2) . By substituting the competitive equilibrium optimality conditions into the latter we obtain the following implementability constraint:
The government plays a Stackelberg game with the agents in the economy: In period 0 it announces a policy G, and subsequently it lets private sector agents choose their allocations as their best response to this policy. We assume that the government has access to a commitment technology and can therefore bind itself to a particular stochastic process for policies once and for all at time 0. This process is contingent on the realizations of technology, government spending and discount factor shocks (8), (10) and (15) . In choosing optimal policies the government needs to predict how household and firm allocations and prices will respond to its policies in a competitive equilibrium. This requirement imposes restrictions on the set of allocations that the government can achieve by varying its policies. We define an allocation rule as a sequence of functions A(G) = {y t , c t , t , b t | G} ∞ t=0 that maps policies G into competitive equilibrium allocations, and a pricing rule as P (G) = {w t , q t | G} ∞ t=0 that maps policies G into competitive equilibrium prices. Then we have the following definition. A political equilibrium is a government policy G, an allocation rule, and a pricing rule such that, given shock processes and given b −1 :
1. The government policy maximizes government utility (14) when allocations and prices are given by A(G) and P (G),
2.
For every government policyG, the allocation A(G) and the price system P (G), together with the government policyG, are a competitive equilibrium.
Based on Marcet and Marimon (1998), we make the above problem recursive by switching to a saddle-point formulation. Letting η t and λ t be the multipliers on the resource and implementability constraints, we have
+λ t
and for given shock processes and an initial value b −1 . The first-order conditions for the political equilibrium are the resource constraint (11), the implementability constraint (16) , and the following conditions with respect to c t , t , and b t :
The Euler equation for the consumption-investment choice of the political planner depends on both the transaction costs specification and the political uncertainty, γ t . Combining the political planner's choice (21) with that of the consumer's (4), we obtain the following expression for the bond price q t :
3 Political Equilibrium -The Results
Calibration
We calibrate parameters for the quarterly frequency. We assume κ = 3 for the weight of leisure in utility. This follows Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994), who take account of distorting taxes. 10 The steady state government spending to output ratio is set to 0.18, which is consistent with historic averages for the US. We set the household discount factor equal to β = 0.999 so that significantly positive real interest rates will be mostly accounted for by government impatience. The quadratic bondholding cost φ and the politician's average impatienceγ are chosen such that the deterministic steady state exhibits a 55% debt to GDP ratio and a 3% per annum real interest rate, very close to the averages for most developed countries over the last 15 years. 11 The
We also explore the limiting Ramsey case, which can be approximated byγ −→ 1 and φ −→ 0. In this case, to again obtain a 3% per annum real interest rate in the deterministic steady state, we set β = 1.03
. The rest of the calibration is as above.
The Non-Stochastic Steady State
Due to the combined presence of government impatience and bond transaction costs, the economy described above has a well-defined deterministic steady state, unlike most other models in this class. This has two main advantages. First, it greatly simplifies computational aspects of solving the model. Second, it gives rise to steady state relationships that are very useful for model interpretation and that lend themselves to calibration of the key parameters φ andγ. These relationships are derived in Appendix A. The key equations are those determining the steady state levels of debt b and the real interest rate r = (1 − q)/q:
These can be combined to yield
Our calibration of φ andγ implies a steady state debt to GDP ratio of 55% by (23) and a deterministic steady state real interest rate of 3% per annum by (25) . Equation (23) shows that government impatienceγ < 1 invariably leads to positive (deterministic) steady state debt, and that more impatience increases steady state debt. On the other hand, a higher bond transaction cost parameter φ 10 This parameter depends on one's benchmark value for the proportion of time spent working in steady state. King and Rebelo (1999) , in a business cycle model without distorting taxes, set κ = 3.48, but values lower than 3 can also be justified on that basis. 11 As we will see, in a political equilibrium the deterministic and stochastic steady states are close to each other.
pulls steady state debt towards zero. What this relationship does not capture is the precautionary savings motive of the government, as in Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and Seppälä (2002) and Shin (2005) . As we will see in the following subsection, this motive only becomes quantitatively significant if γ is extremely close to one and if in addition φ is extremely small -in other words, as we approach the standard case in the literature. Equation (25) shows that the real interest rate equals the simple average of the rates of time preference of the public and private sectors. An environment where politicians are impatient is therefore characterized by high government debt relative to GDP, and by high real interest rates. Equation (24) shows that the real interest rate exceeds the household rate of time preference as long as the debt to GDP ratio exceeds zero, which according to (23) is always the case in the deterministic steady state. This relationship yields a convenient way to assess our calibration of the transaction cost parameter φ, as it is straightforward to show that
Our calibration implies that a one percentage point increase in the debt to GDP ratio raises government borrowing costs by between 4 and 5 basis points per annum. This is in the middle of the range of empirical estimates for the US provided by Engen and Hubbard (2004) and Laubach (2003) . 13 
The Stochastic Steady State
To compute the optimal government policy we analyze the system of equations (3)- (8), (10)- (11), (16) , and (19)- (21), using the baseline calibration. We start by performing a second-order approximation of the model around its unique deterministic steady state, using the DYNARE software.
14
The resulting long run characteristics of the model are presented in Table 1 below. As is typical for an incomplete markets model, both debt and tax rates are more persistent than the underlying shocks.
Insert Table 1 here
As emphasized by Reiter (2005) , local approximation techniques have two problems when applied to the solution of models of optimal fiscal policy. First, initial conditions on Lagrange multipliers such as (18) mean that the economy will in general be far away from steady state in period 0, so that a local approximation around that steady state cannot be expected to give a reasonable approximation to the general problem, starting in period 0. Second, the level of government debt in steady state depends in general on the initial condition and the full transition path to the steady state. These models therefore typically have a continuum of steady states, indexed by the level of government debt. 12 Let the gross real interest rate be denoted byr and the gross rate of time preference byβ. Then the equation can be rewritten asr =β/ 1 −βφ b . The real interest rate is approximately given by r = log(r). For small values of φ, and forβ ' 1, the derivative dr/d b of this expression is approximately equal to φ. 13 Somewhat higher estimates are reported by Gale and Orszag (2003) for the US, and by Chinn and Frankel (2003) for the Euro area.
14 Available at http://pythie.cepremap.cnrs.fr/mailman/listinfo/dynare.
Our model does not suffer from the second problem. It is therefore also easy to check whether the initial condition (18) puts the economy so far away from the deterministic steady state that a local approximation technique must be considered inaccurate. In that case we have two options. First, we can use a global method to characterize the complete transitional dynamics starting in period 0. Or second, we can ignore initial conditions, because in our model the stochastic steady state does not depend on them, and further analyze the properties of the second order approximation. This is the 'optimal policy from a timeless perspective' as in Woodford (1999) . The following two subsections deal with each of these in turn.
Transition to the Stochastic Steady State
Here we ask how a government that is planning at time 0 would transition to the steady state given λ −1 = 0 and an initial level of debt b −1 = 0. We compute the transition to the stochastic steady state using a global method and show the results, for a particular history of shocks, in Figure 1 . We also compute the transition to the deterministic steady state using a Newton method and show the results in Figure 2 .
Our global approach combines the DYNARE-based local solution method that computes the long run with a global method to compute the transition path, the Parameterized Expectations Algorithm (PEA) by Marcet. 15 We first use the simulated stochastic series generated by DYNARE to compute a parameterization of expectations for the long run of the model. Then we use that parameterization as the starting point to search for a parameterization for the transition period. To do so we run one thousand short (50 periods) Monte Carlo simulations inside the PEA and iteratively update the expectations parameterization. Appendix B contains the details of the solution method. Figures 1 and 2 show a scenario where a government that cares less than households about burdening the economy with high levels of debt has inherited no debt at all. It therefore immediately engineers a consumption and output boom through low labor income taxes. As a consequence the primary fiscal deficit increases and debt builds up. This in turn implies that real interest rates show an upward trend throughout the entire transition. High debt and real interest rates over time force the government to turn its primary deficit into a primary surplus by raising the labor tax rate. This eventually depresses output and consumption.
Insert 
Optimal Policy from a Timeless Perspective 3.5.1 Precautionary Government Saving
We now demonstrate that the government precautionary savings and negative debt bias result found for example by Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and Seppälä (2002) holds in a version of our model that approximates the Ramsey case of identical policymaker and household preferences. The key to making this straightforward to demonstrate is our assumption of continuous debt limits. Given that our model is otherwise very conventional, this suggests that negative debt bias may be a very general theoretical result. But it turns out to be very hard to justify on the grounds of plausibility or empirical support, as we stress at the end of this subsection.
The standard optimal taxation model is based on the case of γ = 1, and on replacing the assumption φ = 0 with a discrete ad-hoc debt limit that can be very loose. To approximate this case we assume that γ is very close to one and then compute the stochastic steady state of government debt (and other variables) as φ approaches zero from above. We choose a discount factor ofγ = 0.9999998. The results are presented in Figure 3 . In this and all subsequent figures the broken lines represent the non-stochastic steady state while the solid lines represent the stochastic steady state computed using a second order approximation of the model. Because negative debt bias only arises for extremely small φ, we restrict ourselves to the range φ ∈ [0.000005, 0.0005]. We show φ * 10 4 along the horizontal axis.
Insert Figure 3 here
We observe that debt is indeed negative for this case, but unless φ is extremely small debt remains very close to zero. As φ approaches zero we observe a negative debt to GDP ratio that can be significant, as predicted by the optimal taxation literature. The stochastic steady state of the labor tax rate is then reduced since the interest revenue on the government's assets provides a superior (non-distortionary) source of financing government spending. The reduced tax distortions lead to higher output, consumption and welfare. The latter is shown in the bottom left panel and represents the Lucas (1987) compensating variation in consumption, specifically the percentage reduction in deterministic steady state consumption at φ = 0.0005 that would make agents indifferent between the deterministic and stochastic steady states. If φ becomes sufficiently small we observe higher welfare than in the deterministic steady state. This is because the reduction in tax distortions outweighs the fact that volatility per se is costly to households. By comparing the standard deviations of fiscal variables it can furthermore be shown that, as φ approaches zero, changes in debt rather than changes in labor taxation become the main fiscal shock absorber.
Notice however the extreme assumptions that were required to generate these results. The values of φ at the left of the range shown imply that a one percentage point increase in the debt to GDP ratio is associated with a 0.002 basis points increase in the real interest rate, far less than suggested by even the most conservative empirical evidence. More importantly, the policymaker is assumed to be much more patient than what seems plausible. The results of Figure 3 can in fact be reversed by reducing the policymaker's average differential discount factorγ to 0.999. In that case impatience dominates the precautionary savings motive, debt is always positive, and furthermore debt increases as φ is reduced.
The Effect of Government Discount Factors
We now consider in more detail the effects of politicians' discount factors on equilibrium debt and taxation. Figure 4 shows the impulse responses for a permanent reduction in the policymaker's average discount factorγ in equation (15) . 16 This change induces the government to lower taxes in the short run, because it now has much less concern for the longer run. This creates a short run boom in output and consumption, which is however soon reversed as debt builds up by around 20 percentage points of GDP, requiring higher interest rates, and therefore higher labor taxes to service the larger and more expensive debt. In the long run interest rates rise by around 1%, and the economy contracts by almost 0.5%. 17 Note the similarity between this transition and that shown in Figures 1 and 2 . This similarity is not surprising, because in both cases a government has inherited a debt stock that is low given its current rate of time preference.
Insert Figure 4 here A more systematic exploration of the role of government discount factors is shown in Figure 5 . As in Figure 3 , the plots show the deterministic and stochastic steady states of the model's key variables, but this time holding transaction costs at the baseline calibration of φ = 0.01157 and varyingγ between 0.965 and 0.999 along the horizontal axis. The first striking result is that the differences between the deterministic and stochastic steady states are small, which supports our reliance on a local approximation method. Second, for greater government impatience we observe the outcome suggested by Figure 4 , in that they are associated with attempts to generate shortterm booms at the expense of greater long-run distortions. In the long run they therefore lead to much higher debt and real interest rates. Government budget balance consequently requires a higher labor tax rate, whose distortionary effect lowers output and consumption. As shown in the bottom left panel, this also entails significant welfare losses, this time measured relative to the deterministic steady state atγ = 0.999. Welfare losses in stochastic steady states are higher than those in deterministic steady states due to the welfare costs of volatility. It can also be shown that all components of the government budget become much more volatile as the government becomes more impatient, which contributes to welfare losses.
Insert Figure 5 here We see in Figure 5 that the debt to GDP ratio in the stochastic steady state varies within the empirically observed range for φ = 0.01157 and for the parameterizations of government impatience we have considered. To better understand the range of values that the debt to GDP ratio can take we turn to Figure 6 , which explores its joint dependence on government impatience and on bondholding transaction costs. We observe that low debt to GDP ratios can be a result of either high policymaker patience, which makes it preferable to avoid a debt build-up, or of high bondholding transaction costs, which makes such a build-up costly. 18 Insert Figure 6 here 
Political Instability
In Figure 7 we consider the effects of political instability, illustrated by a temporary reduction in γ t in equation (15), with ρ γ = 0.9. We analyze the nature of business cycles induced by such shocks.
Insert Figure 7 here
The increased impatience on the part of the policymaker induces a temporary reduction in the labor tax rate by almost 0.4% that supports a temporary consumption boom. This is accompanied by an increase in the primary deficit of initially 0.3% of GDP, and a build-up of debt that leads to an almost 2 percentage point increase in the debt to GDP ratio after 3 years. As γ t returns to its original value, the policymaker begins to raise labor taxes in line with his changing preferences. In fact taxes need to rise above their original steady state value for several years to pay down the additional debt accumulated during the transition. The associated distortions contract output and consumption.
The Cyclical Properties of Optimal Fiscal Policy
We finally turn to an examination of the cyclical properties of fiscal variables. The first panel of Figure 8 shows a one standard deviation shock to government spending, and the remaining panels show the endogenous responses of different fiscal variables. There is an immediate sharp increase in the labor tax rate, but as a proportion of GDP labor tax revenue rises by significantly less than the increase in spending. As a result the government must issue additional debt such that its debt stock eventually rises by over 1.5 percentage points of GDP. This debt build-up also leads to an increase in the real interest rate, which puts additional pressure on the government budget. The government must consequently keep its labor tax rate high for a prolonged period to service interest and pay down the additional debt accumulated during the transition. In other words, the tax rate is much more persistent than the underlying spending shock. This result is well known from Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and Seppälä (2002), who show that taxes under incomplete markets follow a near random walk, supporting a claim originally made by Barro (1979) . Figure 9 confirms that the serial correlation of taxes is indeed very high, and as importantly that it is nearly independent of the serial correlation of the underlying shocks to technology or government spending. We find its value to be at or above 0.965 for any serial correlation of the underlying shocks, and approaching a unit root as the underlying shocks approach a unit root. 19 Insert Figure 8 here Insert Figure 9 here
Conclusion
In this paper we set out to answer the question of why governments typically issue large amounts of debt. We show that the theory of optimal taxation under the paradigm of the Ramsey Planner, which is often used to address this question, generally does not give a very satisfactory answer. Indeed it typically finds that a welfare maximizing government should have a negative stock of debt. Furthermore, in our view it seems unnecessary to insist on explaining observed debt levels only through theories that posit a social planner whose objectives coincide fully with those of private 19 Note that in each of the two subplots we shut down the shock whose serial correlation is not shown along the horizontal axis.
agents. Instead we start from the premise that policymakers have their own motivations, which coincide partly but not wholly with the objective function of private agents.
We have suggested one possible way of formulating a theory that takes these differences in objectives into account. A considerable advantage is that we are able to continue working with the well developed analytical framework of the optimal taxation literature. Our theory relies on only two departures from that literature, a small difference between household and government rates of time preference and continuous debt limits. We have shown that it is possible to calibrate both of these in such a way that reasonable predictions are obtained for the sign and size of the government debt to GDP ratio, real interest rates, and the elasticity of real interest rates with respect to debt to GDP ratios. The model also generates intuitive predictions for political business cycles in response to fluctuations in the rate of time preference of policymakers.
We would hope that our approach will be found useful not only for its theoretical contribution but also in applied policymaking, because Ramsey models are not likely to provide a complete understanding of the determinants of many actual fiscal policy outcomes. At this point the optimal taxation literature is considerably less useful than the optimal monetary policy literature for the study of practical policy problems. Our future research agenda is aimed at remedying this, and the present paper is a first small step in this direction.
A The Non-Stochastic Steady State
We drop time subscripts to denote steady state values of variables. The non-stochastic steady state of the economy is given by the system of five equations (11), (16), (19) , (20) and (21) determining the variables c, , b, η and λ. Equations (19), (20) and (21) become
where we have combined (19) with (16) . Consider the case of λ = 0. In that case we would have η = 1/c and η = κ/(1 − ). Then by the consumer's first-order condition (3) it would have to be true that τ = 0 for all periods. Such a case would only be possible in the first-best, which is only achievable if the government can accumulate a sufficient amount of assets to buffer fiscal spending shocks without incurring any additional cost for doing so. This is however ruled out in our model by condition (A3), which makes the steady state debt stock positive. We can therefore rule out λ = 0. The remaining steady state conditions are
In a first step, the steady state values b, c and l can be solved from (A3), (A4) and (A5). In a second step, the remaining equations (A1) and (A2) then determine λ and η. The first step results in the following quadratic equation for :
where
There are therefore two possible solutions for steady state labor, and by (A4) also for steady state consumption. The roots of equation (A6) are given by
While both roots are positive for our parameterization, the smaller root gives rise to a level of consumption very close to zero (c = 0.0002) and a much lower welfare than the larger root. The smaller root is therefore easy to rule out. This means that even for large fluctuations around the steady state, the use of a perturbation method that approximates the solution around the superior steady state remains appropriate.
B Solving the Model Using a Global Method
To apply the Parameterized Expectations Algorithm (PEA), we first reduce the number of equations and variables. The resulting First-Order Conditions for (c t , l t , b t , λ t ) ∞ t=0 are given below:
To solve this system of equations we approximate the expectational terms rather than policy functions. It is well known that expectations, or integrals, are usually smoother functions than the underlying policy functions. We define E t (1/c t+1 ) ≡ Ψ c,t > 0 and E t ((1/c t+1 )λ t+1 ) ≡ Ψ λ,t . These are approximated using iterated nonlinear regressions of Ψ c,t and Ψ λ,t on polynomials S t of first and then second order in the model's state variables z t , g t , b t−1 , and λ t−1 :
Here Ψ c,t , Ψ λ,t and S t are simulated series, ε c t and ε λ t are error terms and β 1 and β 2 are the estimated coefficients of the PEA. To find the starting values for β 1 and β 2 that are needed to run the first simulation of the transition period, we first simulate (B1)-(B4) to obtain one long (10,000 periods) stochastic series that describes the long run behavior of the model, using the coefficients for the policy functions from DYNARE. We then compute the regressions (B5) and (B6) using that long run simulation. The solutions, denoted by β LR 1 and β LR 2 , are used as starting values for the PEA. In the PEA we run short Monte Carlo simulations (1000 series of 50 periods each) of (B1)-(B4) for the transition and use the resulting series in (B5) and (B6) to iteratively update our estimates for β 1 and β 2 until they converge. We experiment with several possible durations of transition and choose T such that the series are, on average, in the neighborhood of their long run means. Alternatively, we could have used the PEA to obtain the long run coefficients but we would have needed to apply the homotopy approach -a much more time consuming exercise. 
